Learning From Mafiaboy by Genosko, Gary
L e a r n in g  F r o m  M a fia bo y
Gary Genosko*
On 12 September 2001, at the Chambre de la jeunesse of the Cour du Québec in the 
District of Montréal, Gilles L. Ouellet J. sentenced a 17-year old male hacker known 
by the handle “Mafiaboy” from Ile-Bizard, a suburban community near Montréal, to 
eight months open custody, one year of probation, and a modest fine of $250 to be 
donated to the non-profit organization Sun Youth. For the crimes of unauthorized 
use of computers and mischief in relation to data, this sentence falls well below the 
two years he could have served under the much less “open” conditions in youth 
detention. Since the time of his sentencing, not much has been written about 
Mafiaboy and the case has faded from view, both popular and critical alike. Without 
question, being sentenced the day after 9/11 guaranteed that Mafiaboy’s story would 
be erased from the mediascape.
There are still lessons to be learned about democracy and the Internet from the 
Canadian case of Mafiaboy.1 There are two specific lessons I want to underline in 
this short paper. The first lesson is that Mafiaboy’s activities can be decoded by 
borrowing ideas from cultural studies and applying them to the youth subculture of 
computer hacking. Instead of capturing Mafiaboy’s actions in a punitive discourse 
of cybercriminality, I give serious consideration to computer hacking as a youth 
subcultural practice of technological experimentation. In this respect, such practice 
expresses a desire to bridge by technological means the gap between social situation 
and positive imagined outcome. The second lesson is the dissatisfaction resulting 
from the difficulty in bringing forward evidence of these types of crimes. Although 
Mafiaboy’s guilty plea ultimately rendered this evidence unnecessary, a lack of 
transparency on the part of the wronged parties with regard to the precise nature of 
their actual damages clouded the case’s value, much to the Judge’s displeasure. Both 
lessons are gleaned from the Judge’s sympathetic opinion of Mafiaboy and the 
lightness of his sentence.
For those who have already forgotten what the fuss was about, a brief review of 
this case, the only one of its kind in Canada, is in order. During the week of 7 
February 2000, the websites of blue chip e-businesses, including Amazon, CNN, 
Dell, eBay, and Yahoo, buckled under the weight of a furious wave of Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks executed by Mafiaboy through hijacked computer 
networks of American universities. A DDoS attack “floods” sites with data packets2 
with which they cannot cope: Mafiaboy had planted a number of Denial of Service 
agents on hijacked computer systems at American universities in California and
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Massachusetts — and remote-controlled the operation with a rootkit , using the 
captured computers to execute the attacks.
The situation for e-commerce at the time was already volatile. Jitters about 
Y2K had not fully subsided, and viruses attached to email messages haunted the 
Webscape, but the deflation of the dot-com bubble after its peak in March 20004 
unquestioningly intensified the pursuit of Mafiaboy; the case of United States v. 
Microsoft Corp.5 was beginning to issue market unfriendly findings, and media 
takeovers of gargantuan proportions were occurring.
The U.S. Attorney General’s office under Janet Reno brought these DDoS 
attacks to the attention of President Bill Clinton; subsequently, the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Louis J. Freeh, began claiming that Canada 
was a “hacker haven”. The attacks also tested the mettle of the heavily upgraded and 
retrained cyber-cops of the U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) 
and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). There is no general agreement 
about the “digital correctness” of DDoS attacks -  they are often dismissed as low- 
level vandalism, but may also serve as collective acts of protest; that is, genuine 
examples of “hacktivism”.6 During and immediately following Mafiaboy’s pursuit 
by FBI and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) agents, and his arrest in 
April 2000, his so-called peers in the digital subculture were not very delicately 
excoriating him as a “packet monkey” and “script kiddie”, two disparaging terms for 
amateurs who do not write their own script (set of computer commands) but instead 
buy it from somebody else and then use it in a malicious way. The two Kevins, 
Mitnick (aka Condor) and Poulsen (aka Dark Dante), well-known former hackers 
now serving as technical experts on e-security, criticized Mafiaboy on technical 
grounds.7 To them, he was no better than a spammer. The counterpoint to these 
criticisms, as well as those leveled by security experts and law officials, was anti­
globalization journalist Naomi Klein’s posting of “My Mafiaboy”, a letter to the 
young hacker.8 Klein’s tongue-in-cheek posting took exception to the quick verdicts 
of Mitnick and others: for her, Mafiaboy was a kind of anti-corporate freedom fighter 
within the anti-globalization movement; he was “committing an act of love...not for 
the integrity of a particular line of code, but for the Internet in general .
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While Mafiaboy was subject to the to-and-fro rocking of the media 
phantasmagoria, his lawyer, Yan Romanowski, was developing a strategy for his 
defence. RCMP computer crimes investigators and Crown prosecutors had already 
indicated to the press that the wiretap evidence they possessed of Mafiaboy’s intent 
to commit computer fraud and data mischief was overwhelming and beyond any 
reasonable doubt. Still, the legal defence strategy that emerged during the pre­
sentencing hearing met the question of intent head on with the counterclaim that the 
accused was testing the security of the websites in question. The defence argued that 
the accused’s motive was “public service”, not malicious damage. As the trial began 
in late June, Mafiaboy entered a plea of guilty with the proviso that he was a “white 
hat” hacker10 conducting “experiments” that would ultimately help selected websites 
improve their security systems. His hacks provided proof of security problems and 
were also helpful in providing solutions to such problems; it was a simple trick: 
expose the fault and then deliver the solution. The point of Mafiaboy’s 
experimentation was to land him a position as a computer security analyst. Evidence 
from his appointed social worker, Hanny Chung, suggested that while Mafiaboy 
identified with the “white hats” and wanted to share the results of his experiments in 
order to secure a position as a computer security analyst, his subsequent and repeated 
actions undermined those stated beliefs. A concerted DDoS attack is not the sort 
thing a “white hat” would launch.
Lesson One
Ouellet J. responded like a seasoned decoder of youth subcultures. He explained, in 
fact, that his strategy was not to dwell on intent, but rather to focus on motivation. 
The judge concluded the defence argument that Mafiaboy was only “conducting a 
test” with the aim of winning a position or developing better firewalls had more the 
air “d ’un prétexte ou d ’une excuse que d ’une réelle motivation (of a pretext or an 
excuse rather than a real motivation).” 11 Using the language of Birmingham school 
cultural studies,12 Ouellet J. took up the power of the imaginary solution against its 
unlivable reality:
Bien sûr, en arrière plan, il n’est pas exclu que l ’adolescent ait pu 
entretenir ce rêve ou pensée magique qu ’en réalisant ce qu ’il considérait 
comme un exploit, comme un ‘grand coup ’, il verrait ses talents reconnus 
et que tous se précipiteraient pour lui offrir de l ’emploi. Mais dans la 
réalité de tous les jours, la véritable motivation de l ’accusé était de tester 
ces sites, non dans le sens de conduire une expérience, mais dans le sense 
de défier et vaincre ces systèmes, pouvant s ’enorgueiller d ’une éventuelle 
réussite et en retirer crédit aux yeux de la communauté des ‘hackers’ 
principalement. (Certainly, in retrospect, it cannot be ruled out that the 
youth cultivated this dream or magical thinking that, in carrying out what 
he considered to be an exploit, ‘un grand coup’, his talents would be
10 In contrast with a “black hat” cyber-criminal who hacks with malicious intent.
11 Supra note 1 at para. 4 [translated by author].
12 John Clarke et al., “Subcultures, Cultures, and Class” in Ken Gelder & Sarah Thornton, eds., The 
Subcultures Reader (New York: Routledge, 1997) 100.
recognized and this would lead to job offers. But in everyday reality, the 
real motivation of the accused was to test these sites, not in the sense of 
performing an experiment, but in the sense of attacking and conquering 
these systems; boasting about his eventual triumphs would enhance his 
reputation in the eyes of the hacker community.)13
The Judge’s explanation for Mafiaboy’s true motivation was peer recognition, going 
so far as to offer his opinion that an “experiment” would not have required such an 
elaborate use of zombie networks.
Mafiaboy may have also discovered that his imagined future as a hacker legend 
or corporate security employee was incommensurable with his everyday reality as a 
computer-loving teen whose curiosity passed over into mischief and beyond. The 
choice of unreality over reality is common to group fantasies among youth 
subcultures. It is a magical resolution of the inherent contradiction in breaking 
security systems in order to be welcomed into the computer security fold; it allows 
one to live a dream of peer recognition and celebration, of employability, and even of 
personal freedom, while sitting alone, before the screen, still a teenager living with 
one’s parents in the suburbs. Early work on youth subcultures undertaken within the 
Birmingham school of cultural studies emphasized the role of subcultural style and 
ritual behaviours as means of working out “magical” or “imagined” resolutions to 
socio-economic predicaments and inter-generational contradictions that would have 
otherwise remained hidden.14 The “imaginary solution” is quite “unlivable” 15 even 
if for a time, the prospect of wearing the “white hat” of a Master hacker by bringing 
down popular websites pushes reality aside. This was not lost on the Judge, though 
Mafiaboy’s wishfulness, and the precedence he gave to unreality over reality, 
ultimately did not stand up to the youth justice system, to the necessity of high 
school, and to subsequent entry into the meritocracy. Still, this does not mean that 
late at night, in his bedroom, before the screen, Mafiaboy had not won for himself a 
space away from the dominant culture.16 But in this space, he would not find an 
enduring solution to his predicament, especially through the symbolic mantle of 
untouchable Master hacker. His attempts at a more concrete solution through the 
demonstration of his skill certainly played in the media for a brief but intense season, 
but they did not play out as a viable answer to the problem of career choice and entry 
into a profession.
13 Supra note 1 at para. 4 [translated by author].
14 Supra note 12.
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York: Routledge, 1993) 442; Dick Hebdige, “The Meaning of Mod” in Stuart Hall & Tony Jefferson, 
eds., Resistance Through Rituals (London: Hutchinson, 1976) 87.
16 Although hackers consider bragging on Internet Relay Chat to be totally “lame”; see Douglas Thomas, 
Hacker Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) at 139.
Lesson Two
The spectacular and hyperbolic assessments of the economic damage caused by 
Mafiaboy’s DDoS attacks lead to the second lesson. In a case such as this, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the precise extent of the damages caused by 
the accused’s actions. Estimates of revenue losses, losses in market capitalization, 
costs for upgrading security holes, and costs of repairing consumer confidence are 
arrived at by speculation and extrapolation. These “costs” are quite intangible, so 
much so that companies cannot accurately quantify them. They represent potential 
losses rather than the actual damages sustained. The escalation of cost claims across 
the media reports, from millions through hundreds of millions to billions, was neither 
justified nor explained by the companies or the media. However misleading, 
metaphors seemed to suffice: the engine of the North American economy was being 
stalled by hacking; hacking can be blamed for the bursting of the e-bubble economy. 
Certain large numbers were produced by third parties like the Boston Yankee Group, 
which cited a figure of $1.2 billion U.S., but they lacked foundation.17 Such big 
numbers were consonant with both the shock of this first big wave of DDoS attacks 
on established names, and the attention they attracted as events unfolded in the 
highly charged atmosphere of highs and lows on the NASDAQ Index. Those 
numbers did not enhance Mafiaboy’s reputation among his peers, but instead 
attracted a united North American intelligence response. One wonders how much 
notice a low-grade technical attack, easily traceable through router logs, would have 
received without these inflated damage reports. They didn’t impress the Judge as 
even he notes that not one of the vendors suffering a loss came forward to quantify 
that loss; this lack of cooperation concerned him, especially in light of the delirious 
media speculation about the case.18 The Judge’s opinion was that computer crime 
cannot be successfully fought in the absence of cooperation and collaboration 
between victims and police: “i7 est déplorable que ces sociétés n ’aient pas fourni 
une meilleure collaboration aux autorités policières (it is deplorable that these 
businesses did not make a greater effort to collaborate with police agencies).”19 This 
opinion has motivated the RCMP to build better contacts with Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) whose normal practice is to quietly close accounts rather than report 
incidents of hacking. The Mafiaboy case is cited by the RCMP as a primary example 
of the need for an effective strategy given that “before [the big wave of DDoS 
attacks] four Internet accounts registered to Mafiaboy's residence were terminated 
for hacking activity by three separate ISPs. Hacking activity from these accounts 
was never reported beyond the individual ISPs.”20
17 Research consultancy groups like Yankee serve the interests of their clients, even when they issue 
press statements; Yankee is owned by a private equity firm specializing in telecommunications. See 
online: The Yankee Group <http://www.yankeegroup.com>.
18 Supra note 1 at para. 7.
19 Ibid. [translated by author],
20 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Criminal Analysis Branch, 
“Hackers: A Canadian Police Perspective, Part 1” (2001).
In my estimation, Ouellett J. did not go far enough in providing guidance on 
how to build cross-institutional and transparent cooperation to combat cybercrime; 
despite his criticism of the e-commerce companies’ silence,21 he admits the 
legitimacy of false excess (inflated damage estimates) in the media maelstrom. Real 
gains in this fight will continue to be precluded as long as short-term gains are 
achieved through both willful misdirection in the form of groundless and inflated 
damage estimates, and the failure of computer hacking victims to deflate the 
promotional spiral of these wild estimates by pursuing damage claims in court. The 
short-term damage is that justice is served by other means, the absence of critical 
counter-assays is institutionalized, and the passage from bad press to genuine success 
in the battle against cybercriminality cannot take place in the undemocratic court of 
popular opinion or on the uneven playing field of the North American media. In the 
game of confidence building in the e-transactions market, it is not in the interest of e- 
commerce operations to present accurate reports of damages suffered by system 
breakdowns, regardless of cause, because it may expose a level of risk that is 
unbearable, even for the core customer base. It needs to be acknowledged that this 
result contributes neither to the understanding of youth subcultures around 
computing, nor to building bridges between security and other interested agencies in 
a publicly accountable manner.
In summary, the first lesson opened the case of Mafiaboy to an expanded field 
of cultural understanding of youth practices around information technologies that 
forms the necessary backbone to an effective analysis of the real threats of 
cybercrime in the digital age. The critical and sympathetic understanding of the 
“imaginary” bridge that a hack erects across the divide between teenage alienation 
and mature adulthood, between a McJob and a career, is vital to fully appreciating 
the motivation of young hackers. The second lesson exposed a weak point in the 
system of prosecuting cases of this type, demonstrated by the fact that the Judge’s 
call for cross-sector cooperation in the fight against cybercrime rings somewhat 
hollow in this case.
21 Supra note 1 at para. 7.
